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US Leadership and NATO

Modifying America's Forward Presence
in Eastern Europe
John R. Deni

Abstract: Starting in 2017, Washington plans to begin heel-to-toe
rotations of an armored brigade from the United States to Eastern
Europe. In some respects, this represents a significant improvement
over the assurance and deterrence steps taken by the United States
and several of its NATO allies over the last two years. Although the
administration’s plan is indeed a step in the right direction, it falls
short of the hype ascribed by the media, not to mention Moscow.
More broadly, the US approach to reassurance and deterrence still
suffers from some strategic shortcomings.

S

tarting in 2017, Washington plans to begin “heel-to-toe” rotations of an armored brigade combat team from the United
States to Eastern Europe, assuming the US Congress agrees to
President Obama’s funding request. This decision represents a significant improvement over the assurance and deterrence steps taken by the
United States and several of its NATO allies over the last two years.
The measures to date have included short-term rotational deployments of forces from North America and/or Western Europe for
limited-duration exercises and other training events in Eastern Europe.
From both temporal and qualitative perspectives such deployments
leave much to be desired. For example, they lack the constancy of
heel-to-toe rotations, essentially creating gaps of weeks or months,
which Russia could exploit to achieve a fait accompli. Additionally, the
deployments to date have not always include armored units, which puts
alliance defenses at a disadvantage relative to Russian military power in
the region. Deploying an armored brigade combat team on a rotational
basis starting in early 2017 will directly address these shortcomings.
More broadly, the expanded European Reassurance Initiative (ERI)
program signals a renewed American commitment to and leadership of
the alliance. This is especially important at a time when Europeans have
questioned whether and how their continent figures into Washington’s
strategic priorities. As the United States deepens its involvement in
Iraq and the fight against ISIL, continues to consolidate stability in
Afghanistan, and rebalances to the Asia-Pacific region, European allies
may have some reason to think Washington’s attention is focused elsewhere. The expansion of the ERI program—especially as seen through
the media fanfare that greeted its announcement—should provide solace
to those concerned about US leadership in NATO.
Despite these and other strengths of the ERI expansion though,
the program and its centerpiece—a rotationally deployed armored
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brigade—have several shortcomings. Although the ERI expansion is a
step in the right direction, it appears unlikely to effectively or thoroughly
address the security challenges confronting vital American interests in
Europe. This article will address how and why that is the case, and what
might be done to augment the ERI expansion. Ultimately, these steps
could help to strengthen the broader US response to Russia’s upending
of the European security environment with its invasion and dismembering of Ukraine.

Rotational Deployments to Date

American forward-based military strength in Europe has dwindled
dramatically in recent decades, both quantitatively and qualitatively.
From roughly 122,000 soldiers in 1992, the US Army has seen its
forward-based presence in Europe steadily decline to roughly 30,000
soldiers today. The largest American forward-based combat arms formations in Europe today include a Stryker cavalry regiment of roughly
5,000 troops and an airborne brigade of about 3,800 troops.
Qualitatively, US force structure in Europe has also been decimated
by cuts over the last 20 years. The only remaining US combat aviation
brigade in Europe has been reduced significantly in the last two years
(ironically, since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine) to a single attack battalion, about a dozen heavy-lift CH-47 Chinook helicopters, ten general
support UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters, and a medical evacuation unit.
Moreover, key enablers have been stripped from the forward-based US
force structure in Europe, like artillery, cyber warfare, and electronic
warfare capabilities. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the lack of
US heavy mechanized formations represents a major challenge, especially in light of recent Russian investments in armor.1
Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and its invasion of Ukraine’s
Donbas region exposed the shortsightedness of the force structure cuts,
again from both qualitative and quantitative perspectives. In an effort
to make best use of the remaining American force structure in Europe
to reassure allies and deter Russian aggression in northeastern Europe,
the United States deployed four companies from the Italy-based 173rd
airborne brigade, one each to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland
in April 2014. These units participated in exercises and other training
events throughout the spring and summer of that year, and were a physical manifestation of the American commitment to allied solidarity.
That same summer in 2014, the Pentagon announced the European
Reassurance Initiative, a nearly $1 billion program to support rotational
troop deployments from the United States, as well as other reassurance
and deterrence measures.2 Shortly thereafter—in October 2014—the
Italy-based companies were replaced with companies from the 1st
brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division, based in Texas. This temporary
rotational deployment lasted roughly two months and included armored
equipment such as Abrams tanks and Bradley infantry fighting vehicles,
1      Charles K. Bartles, “Getting Gerasimov Right,” Military Review 96, no. 1 (January-February
2016): 36-37. For example, Moscow has dedicated a significant amount of development and
procurement resources toward the innovative T-14 Armata tank.
2      The ERI has supported reassurance and deterrence efforts on the part of all services, including
expansion of the US Air Force’s aviation detachment in Poland, US Navy deployments in the Black
Sea, and expanded efforts on part of the US Marine Corps’ Black Sea Rotational Force.
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thereby addressing some of the capability gaps in the US force structure
in Europe.
Following the winter holiday break, the Germany-based US 2nd
Stryker Cavalry Regiment deployed one company to each of the same
four countries for roughly two and a half months. Thereafter, the United
States followed a similar pattern for the remainder of 2015 and through
2016, exchanging CONUS-based companies and Europe-based companies to achieve a nearly continuous presence in northeastern Europe.
These deployments were warmly welcomed by the receiving countries
and, in conjunction with other US and allied reassurance measures,
contributed to strengthening NATO’s deterrent posture.
Nevertheless, some of the most nervous allies in Eastern Europe
expressed concern that the steps taken by the United States and other
allies were necessary but insufficient. Some allied governments argued
rather vocally and publicly for a far more robust NATO response, one
that would include permanent deployment of troops.3 In fact, Poland’s
leaders characterized the alliance’s unwillingness to do so as evidence
that Poland and other allies in Central and Eastern Europe were being
relegated to some sort of “buffer state” status.4
Assessments that are somewhat more objective, such as those available through war games and other analyses, have pointed to similar
conclusions regarding the insufficiency of allied responses in northeastern Europe.5 Specifically, given the limited force posture of the alliance
in northeastern Europe, NATO would find it difficult to defend or
retake Baltic state territory in the face of any large-scale, determined
Russian invasion.
Simultaneously, there appears to have been a growing sense within
the US Department of Defense that the United States and its allies
needed to think more strategically about the way forward, beyond the
measures taken in 2014 immediately after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
More specifically, the administration evidently saw the need for “a fundamental change” in its approach, from merely assurance to an equally
strong emphasis on deterrence.6
For all of these reasons, the Obama administration proposed a
dramatic increase in ERI funding in its 2017 budget proposal. Sent to
Congress in February, the proposal increases funding from roughly
$789 million in fiscal year 2016 to just over $3.4 billion for fiscal year
2017. Much of this more than four-fold increase in funding will be used
to pay for the rotational deployment of an armored brigade combat team
to Central and Eastern Europe, plus the prepositioning of enough US
equipment for a so-called “fires” brigade (consisting of artillery, rockets,
and so forth), a sustainment brigade, a division headquarters, and other
3      Kjetil Malkenes Hovland, “Estonian President Calls for Permanent NATO Base in Country,”
The Wall Street Journal, September 2, 2014.
4      Henry Foy, “NATO Treats Poland Like a Buffer State, Says New President,” The Financial
Times, August 13, 2015.
5      Julia Ioffe, “The Pentagon Is Preparing New War Plans for a Baltic Battle Against Russia,”
Foreign Policy, September 18, 2015.
6      Email exchange with a civilian staff member at US Army Europe Headquarters in
Wiesbaden, Germany, February 19, 2016. See also, Philip Breedlove, “US European Command
Posture Statement 2016,” February 25, 2016, www.eucom.mil/media-library/article/35164/
u-s-european-command-posture-statement-2016.
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enabling units. In sum, if the proposal is fully funded, the United States
would have nearly a division’s worth of capability in Europe for the first
time in many years.

Beefing Up?

Media accounts have somewhat breathlessly claimed the United
States is “fortifying,” “beefing up,” and “significantly” increasing its
military presence in Eastern Europe.7 Indeed, adding a rotationally
deployed armored brigade of 4,200 troops represents a major increase
in the number of US soldiers on the ground in Europe at any given
moment, at least in terms of percentage. The addition of a rotationally
deployed heavy brigade is roughly a 50 percent increase in the number
of combat soldiers in Europe.
Moreover, the rotationally deployed brigade brings with it capabilities that are not currently organic to the US brigades permanently
forward-based in Europe—namely, armor. Over a decade ago, the
Congressionally-mandated Overseas Basing Commission (OBC) cautioned against a plan by the President George W. Bush administration
to remove all US armored units from Europe.8 That plan went forward
anyway, and today the OBC’s concerns appear prescient.
Additionally, the plan to conduct heel-to-toe rotations represents
an important improvement over current deployments of US forces to
northeastern Europe. Gaps, or underlaps, between current deployments
of US- and Europe-based American units potentially offer windows
of opportunity for Russian adventurism in Eastern Europe. Turning
discrete deployments into heel-to-toe rotations means the elimination
of underlaps between returning and deploying units—as well as the
elimination of months-long underlaps in the presence of armored units
in northeastern Europe.
Finally, and more broadly, the increase in ERI funding and
American military presence in Europe signals a growing understanding
in Washington that the alliance needs to move toward a “new normal”
n Eastern Europe and the United States must lead it there in close coordination with Berlin, Paris, and London. The Poles and the Baltic states
in particular want to know the alliance has a mid-term plan beyond a
mere tripwire and the Obama administration’s ERI funding increase is
an important step in that process.9
For all these reasons, the ERI funding increase and the force-structure moves that comprise it are a step in the right direction. However, the
moves fall short of the dramatic headlines. Perhaps more importantly,

7      Mark Landler and Helene Cooper, “US Fortifying Europe’s East to Deter Putin,” The New
York Times, February 1, 2016; Lolita C. Baldor, “US to Beef Up Military Presence in Eastern
Europe,” The Associated Press, March 30, 2016; and “USA Plans to Significantly Increase Military
Presence in Eastern Europe,” Baltic News Network, February 2, 2016, www.bnn-news.com/
usa-plans-to-significantly-increase-military-presence-in-eastern-europe-137731.
8      Commission on Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States (Arlington, VA:
Commission on Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure, May 9, 2005) also known as the
Overseas Basing Commission, Preliminary Report to the President and the US Congress, https://fas.org/irp/
agency/dod/obc.pdf.
9      Interview with a senior political appointee within the Polish Ministry of Defense, March 2,
2016.
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the US approach to reassurance and deterrence still suffers from some
strategic shortcomings as well.

Necessary but Insufficient

As argued above, the ERI funding increase and the rotationally
deployed forces it will pay for are necessary steps. However, for several
reasons the plan outlined to date is not quite sufficient to achieve broader
objectives necessary to safeguard Western interests. For starters, the size
of the additional force—roughly 4,200 troops—is inadequate to deter
the Russian military by denial. Moscow has shown it can muster tens of
thousands of troops for its snap exercises, often without NATO having
any advance warning.10 Aided by interior lines of communication—as
well as reduced Western capacity to detect and interpret warnings and
indicators of Russian military movements and intentions—Moscow
can quickly assemble a force orders of magnitude larger than a single
armored brigade, thereby providing the Kremlin with the capacity to
overrun the “beefed up” American presence easily.11
It is true other allies—specifically, the United Kingdom and
Germany—also are planning to begin or are considering heel-to-toe
rotations.12 However, these additional force structure contributions will
be relatively small—perhaps hundreds of troops each, at most. For this
reason, the United States and its allies appear to be only strengthening
their ability to deter by punishment—that is, adding to the tripwire of
American and other allied forces in northeastern Europe.
Further frustrating efforts at deterrence-by-denial is the fact
that the rotationally deployed US brigade will be split among six
countries—Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria.
This dispersed deployment will likely prevent the brigade from easily
and quickly achieving mass and hence its full potential during a time of
crisis. Dispersed deployment will also make it more expensive and more
time consuming to assemble the brigade for the purpose of training in
a single location.
More importantly, the dispersed deployment does not make sense
geo-strategically. In short, it makes no sense to deploy parts of the
brigade to Bulgaria and Romania when the challenge Russia poses on
the ground is not particularly salient to either country. Admittedly,
Russia does still maintain troops and an impressive arsenal of military
ammunition and equipment in Transnistria, the breakaway region of
Moldova. However, this is a miniscule personnel presence by Russia’s
standards, amounting to roughly 1,500 troops.13 Meanwhile, the number
of ethnic Russians in Tulcea, the Romanian county that borders Ukraine
along the Black Sea, amounts to just 5 percent of the population there.
Across all of Romania, ethnic Russians comprise about one tenth of one
percent—the same is true in Bulgaria.
10      Thomas Frear, “Anatomy of a Russian Exercise,” European Leadership Network, August 12,
2015, www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/anatomy-of-a-russian-exercise_2914.html.
11      John Vandiver, “Breedlove Tells Congress US Must Rebuild Forces in Europe to Confront
Newly Aggressive Russia,” Stars and Stripes, February 25, 2016, www.stripes.com/news/breedlovetells-congress-us-must-rebuild-forces-in-europe-to-confront-newly-aggressive-russia-1.396034.
12      Callum Paton, “UK Commits to Long-Term Troop Deployment in Baltic States as NATO
Checks Russian Aggression,” International Business Times, October 8, 2015.
13      The Military Balance (London: International Institute for Security Studies, 2016), 188.
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In contrast, the challenges posed by Russia on the ground in northeastern Europe are far more acute. There, Russia can quickly amass
thousands of troops just across the border from allied territory, and it
could conceivably exploit the sizeable Russian minorities in Estonia (25
percent) and Latvia (26 percent) as a pretext for adventurism.14 Moreover,
the Baltic states lack strategic depth, complicating allied efforts to
defend, reinforce, and/or counter covert or overt Russian actions. In
sum, it is entirely unclear from a military perspective why any portion of
the rotational brigade should be based in southeastern Europe. Instead,
the alliance and its most at-risk members would be far better off if the
entire brigade were based in the Baltic states.
In addition to being geographically misaligned, the ERI is also fiscally misaligned. Certainly, the ERI’s $3.4 billion is no small amount, but
it is a funding line that resides in the Overseas Contingency Operations
(OCO) account, not the Department of Defense’s base budget. This
somewhat arcane distinction implies a lack of constancy in Washington’s
outlook, but more importantly it prevents DoD from programming
the rotational brigade requirement into future year budget planning.
Politically, it is probably safe to assume for now the ERI will retain the
support it has had over the last two years, but the fact that ERI is not a
program of record in the base budget puts it at greater risk. Moving the
ERI into the base budget is not without its challenges though, not the
least of which is figuring out what other priority requirement it should
displace in an environment of tight service budgets.
The ERI initiative also suffers from command and control shortcomings. Its centerpiece—the heavy rotational brigade—as well as
the other two US brigades permanently forward stationed in Europe,
will lack a dedicated intermediate-level command and control element.
In other words, there is no American divisional command based in
Europe, again thanks to the deep, hasty drawdowns of the last 15 years.
Instead, the 4th Infantry Division maintains a roughly 100-person
“mission command element” in Germany, prepared to expand if and
when necessary—assuming the facilities it relies upon in Baumholder
are not vacated in yet another round of downsizing. At least one analysis
has shown a division headquarters sent from the United States may not
arrive in time to make a difference in the fate of the Baltic States.15
In addition to lacking sufficient command and control, the announcement of the rotational deployment lacked any multilateral framework.
Given the cuts in force structure across the alliance since the end of the
Cold War, NATO’s operations and deployments have become increasingly multinational. Two generations ago, at the height of the Cold War,
multinationality within NATO force structure essentially stopped at the
corps level. A single generation ago, as NATO became heavily involved
in peacekeeping operations in the Western Balkans, multinationality
went as far as the division level. Today, multinationality within NATO
operations extends beyond the brigade and occasionally to the battalion
level or company level—for instance, a US infantry company served
14      These figures comes from the 2016 CIA World Factbook, which also estimates that ethnic
Russians comprise 6 percent of Lithuania’s population.
15      David A. Shlapak and Michael W. Johnson, Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank:
Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2016).
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within a Romanian battalion in Afghanistan.16 However, the announced
rotational deployment lacked any kind of multinational framework and is
instead a series of bilateral efforts between the United States and several
allies, even though it had been known for many months that Germany
and the United Kingdom were considering or planning similar deployments. Reportedly, the US rotational brigade deployment will be cast as
part of a broader allied plan announced at the July 2016 Warsaw Summit,
so perhaps then this bilateral move will be placed within an appropriate
multinational context that can be used to incentivize force contributions
from other allies.17
Finally, the ERI plan failed to include a moratorium—if only
couched in ‘for the foreseeable future’ terms—on further US unit drawdowns and facility closures in Europe. As a practical matter, such a
moratorium would admittedly have limited impact, given the dramatic
cuts to US forward presence to date—in other words, there is not
much left to cut. However, as a political and rhetorical matter, such an
announcement would contribute to reversing European perceptions the
Obama administration has been too preoccupied with rebalancing to
Asia and/or fighting extremists in the Middle East. It would also counter
the notion the ERI lacks constancy given its placement in the OCO
account, as discussed above.

Fit for Purpose?

If the administration had addressed each of the shortcomings
outlined above, it still remains unclear whether a rotationally deployed
armored brigade is really the right tool for the challenge Russia poses
in northeastern Europe. A US armored brigade is best suited to counter
the worst-case scenario of a Russian conventional attack against allied
forces. A Russian attack on the Baltic States would certainly be catastrophic for European security, but it is highly unlikely. This is not just
the perspective of various academic and think-tank analysts—it is also
the view of US military commanders on the ground in northeastern
Europe.18 Even Russian President Vladimir Putin—in an interview with
an Italian newspaper—claimed that only in a “mad person’s dream”
could one imagine Russia would attack NATO.19 Putin is certainly no
paragon of honesty, so it is unclear whether this statement amounts to
sufficient reassurance for the purposes of the Baltic States and Poland.
Therefore, a forward-based heavy brigade—or two, or three—is necessary as an insurance policy for the less likely, catastrophic case of a
Russian invasion.
16      Jerry Wilson, “1-4 Infantry Leaves Legacy of Team Work in Afghanistan,” Army, January 31,
2011, www.army.mil/article/51087/1_4_Infantry_leaves_legacy_of_team_work_in_Afghanistan.
17      Julian Barnes and Anton Troianovski, “NATO Allies Preparing to Put Four Battalions at
Eastern Border With Russia,” The Wall Street Journal, April 29, 2016.
18      See for example, Matthew Kroenig, “Facing Reality: Getting NATO Ready for a New
Cold War,” Survival 57, no. 1 (2015): 49-70; Mark Kramer, “The New Russian Chill in the Baltic,”
Current History 114, no. 770 (March 2015): 108-114; Robert Person, “6 Reasons Not to Worry about
Russia Invading the Baltics,” The Washington Post, November 12, 2015; and Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr.,
“Putin Won’t Blitz Baltic States—But NATO Has A Plan…,” Breaking Defense, March 2, 2015, www.
breakingdefense.com/2015/03/putin-wont-blitz-baltic-states-but-nato-has-a-plan/.
19      Vladimir Putin, Interview with the Italian newspaper Il Corriere della Sera, July 7, 2015, www.
corriere.it/english/15_giugno_07/vladimir-putin-interview-to-the-italian-newspaper-corriere-sera44c5a66c-0d12-11e5-8612-1eda5b996824.shtml.
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What is more likely to emanate from the Kremlin, though, is a
form of ambiguous or hybrid warfare—that is, operations and activities
designed to help Moscow achieve political objectives in Europe without
crossing the threshold that would trigger an Article 5 response on the
part of NATO.20 If so, a heavy brigade is unlikely to be of great utility to
the West. For instance, a heavy brigade is probably not the best choice
for building resilience within civil governance institutions, for enhancing military-civilian cooperation during a crisis, for augmenting border
observation and control, for strengthening information operations capabilities, for conducting offensive and defensive cyber operations, or for
engaging with adversaries across the entire electro-magnetic spectrum.
It is here—in managing the most likely challenges from Russia—
that the ERI needs to be augmented with additional tools beyond a heavy
brigade and tons of prepositioned equipment. Although the FY2017
ERI spending request includes $20 million for increased intelligence
analysis and $24 million for additional State Partnership Program activities, these relatively small amounts of money are unlikely to address the
array of most likely challenges facing American allies in northeastern
Europe.

Conclusion

The plan to expand the ERI program, with the rotationally deployed
armor brigade as its centerpiece, is a step in the right direction. Along
with the other elements of the ERI effort, the heavy brigade will address
some of the shortcomings of the US and allied responses to date, such
as the absence of a heel-to-toe armored presence. More broadly, it also
signals to NATO allies, as well as to Russia, that European security
remains a vital interest to the United States.
To think, though, that it alone is sufficient to safeguard vital US
interests in Europe and those of America’s allies is somewhat shortsighted. The ERI expansion plan suffers from several shortcomings,
including its relatively small size in comparison to the conventional
threat presented by Russia across the border, and the intention to disperse it across six countries in northeastern and southeastern Europe.
Even if these shortcomings are addressed, there remains the question of whether an armored brigade is really a useful tool given the
most likely challenges posed by Russia. Certainly an armored brigade
would be helpful—although by no means decisive—in the event of a
conventional assault on the Baltic States by Russian forces. However, a
direct Russian attack on allied territory remains unlikely. Instead, Russia
seems far more likely to pursue its various objectives in Europe and
Eurasia through a variety of less overt tactics. An armored brigade is
a rather blunt instrument for countering less overt, more “ambiguous”
tactics and operations. For this reason, the United States should employ
the ERI to build resilience and asymmetric response capabilities across
all the Baltic states and Poland. With a change in emphasis, Washington
can ensure the ERI is both necessary and sufficient for the task at hand,
strengthening its leadership of the alliance during what looks to be an
era of fraught NATO-Russia relations.
20     For example, see Mary Ellen Connell and Ryan Evans, Rapporteurs, Russia’s “Ambiguous
Warfare” and Implications for the US Marine Corps (Arlington: Center for Naval Analysis, May 2015), 13.

